NFC Chip Verification

NFC chip verification works by reading the data stored in the document's chip over a short-range radio link, then checking the electronic signature that the issuing state placed over that data. NFC stands for near-field communication, which phones also use for contactless payments. The format of the chip follows Doc 9303, the travel document specification of the International Civil Aviation Organization. The check usually runs in this order.

1. The person photographs the data page of the document. The app reads the printed machine-readable lines, or a number printed on the card.
2. The app uses those printed details to derive the key that opens the chip. This stops the chip being read by someone who has not seen the document.
3. The person holds the document against the phone. The app reads the holder's details, the photo and a signed security record.
4. The app recalculates a checksum of each piece of data it has read and compares it with the checksums in the security record. It then checks that the record was signed with a certificate that chains back to the issuing state.
5. Where the chip supports it, the app also asks the chip to prove that it holds a secret key that cannot be copied out. This detects a cloned chip.

Step four is the heart of the check. If one character of the name or one pixel of the photo had been changed, the checksums would no longer match. If the data had been written by anyone other than the issuing state, the signature would not chain back to that state's certificate.

The chip holds a digital copy of what is printed on the data page, together with the data needed to check it. That means the holder's name, date of birth, nationality, the document number and the expiry date. It also means the holder's photo, as a digital image file.

Many documents also store fingerprints. These are protected more strictly than the rest. An ordinary app cannot read them. Access is reserved for authorised inspection systems. A remote identity check therefore works with the photo.

The last item is the security record: the list of checksums of the stored data, signed by the issuing state. Nothing in the chip records whether the document has since been reported lost.

NFC chip verification does not prove that the person holding the document is its holder. It proves that the document is genuine. A stolen passport passes a chip check as well as it would in the hands of its owner.

The check is therefore paired with a second one. The person takes a live image of their face, which is compared with the photo read from the chip. A liveness test confirms that a real person is in front of the camera. The chip helps here too, since the comparison uses the image the issuer stored.

Two further limits are worth knowing. The chip carries the expiry date. It cannot say whether the document was reported lost or cancelled after it was issued, so where the risk calls for it the firm needs another source for that. The result is also only as good as the list of state certificates the verifier trusts. A firm that buys the check can ask its supplier where that list comes from and how it is kept current.

No. Neither the eIDAS Regulation nor the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation mentions the chip. Both set a result to reach, then leave the technique open.

Under Article 24(1a) of eIDAS, a qualified trust service provider that issues a qualified certificate may verify identity by an identification method that ensures the identification of the person with a high level of confidence. A conformity assessment body must confirm that the method does so. A chip read can be one part of such a method. Whether it is needed is decided in the provider's conformity assessment. Article 24(1c) required the European Commission to establish, by 21 May 2025, a list of reference standards for the verification of identity.

The Anti-Money Laundering Regulation, which applies from 10 July 2027, lets a firm verify a customer through the submission of an identity document, passport or equivalent (Article 22(6)(a)). It does not say how the document is to be examined. Reading the chip is one way to show that the document submitted was authentic.

A chip read should not be confused with the other route in Article 22(6)(b), electronic identification means at assurance level substantial or high and relevant qualified trust services. Some national identity cards are part of a notified electronic identification scheme. Logging in through that scheme is electronic identification. Reading a passport chip in an ordinary app is a document check.

It cannot be used when the document has no chip, when the phone has no NFC reader, or when the chip is damaged. Passports with a chip carry a small symbol on the cover: a rectangle with a circle in the middle. Older identity cards and some other documents have no chip.

A method that depends on the chip alone will turn some genuine clients away. A provider may keep a fallback, such as a check of the printed security features from images of the document. The fallback gives weaker evidence that the document is authentic. A firm should know which path each client went through, since the two do not carry the same weight in a client file.

Some failures are only practical. The chip sits in a different place in each document, so the person may need to move the phone slowly along the cover.