Verified Client Workspace

A verified client workspace is a client portal with one added condition: nobody gets in until their identity has been checked. A person invited to it first proves who they are, normally with an identity document. Only then do they see the matter, the documents and the other participants.

Two further features complete the usual meaning. Documents can be signed inside the workspace, with no separate signing service. The workspace also keeps one record that covers the identity check, the access to documents and the signatures.

The term is new, and it comes from suppliers. Trust Circle is ZealiD's verified client workspace. No regulation, standard or certification scheme uses the phrase, so it carries no guaranteed meaning. A firm that meets it in a brochure should read it as a claim to be tested. Three questions test it: who verifies, by what method, and what evidence the firm receives.

The difference lies in what an account stands for. In an ordinary secure client portal, an account stands for an email address. The firm invites the address, and whoever opens the invitation sets the password. In a verified client workspace, an account stands for a person whose identity document has been checked.

That changes what the record of activity can show. A portal's record says that a certain account opened a file. A workspace's record can say that an identified person did, provided each later login is tied to the person who passed the check.

The second difference is signing. Many portals send documents to a separate signing service, which identifies the signer again in its own way, often by email. In a verified client workspace the identity that was checked at the door is the one that signs.

Everything else is shared. Both keep a single copy of each document, set access per matter and record activity. The secure client portal entry sets a portal beside email and a shared drive, point by point. That comparison applies to a verified client workspace as well, with one row changed: how the recipient is identified.

It means whatever the supplier's method delivers, so the method is what a firm should ask about. "Verified" is not a protected word. A check that compares a photographed document with a selfie and a check done to the standard required for a qualified certificate can both be sold under it.

EU law offers two reference points. The first is Article 22(6) of the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation, which names the means by which an obliged entity obtains the information to verify a customer's identity. One is an identity document, passport or equivalent, with information from reliable and independent sources where relevant. The other is electronic identification means at assurance level substantial or high and relevant qualified trust services under the eIDAS Regulation.

The second is the eIDAS Regulation itself. A qualified trust service provider must verify a person's identity before it issues a qualified certificate (Article 24(1)). Article 24(1a) limits the methods. They are a European Digital Identity Wallet or a notified electronic identification means at assurance level high, an existing qualified signature or seal, physical presence, or another method that ensures identification with a high level of confidence and is confirmed by a conformity assessment body. Where a workspace produces qualified electronic signatures, each signer has been identified by one of those routes.

Three practical questions follow. Who performs the check: the workspace supplier, a subcontractor or a qualified trust service provider? Is the check tied to later logins, or is it a single event after which a password is enough? What does the firm receive? A green tick is not a record. Article 77(1)(a) of the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation requires an obliged entity to retain a copy of the documents and information obtained in customer due diligence, including information obtained through electronic identification means.

It matters when the firm has to be able to show who was on the other side, and has no other way of knowing.

The clearest case is a client the firm never meets. A new client in another country sends an identity document by email and receives a portal invitation at the same address. Nothing in that sequence connects the document to the person using the account. Checking identity before access closes the gap.

The second case is a document where the signer's identity will be examined later: a power of attorney, a guarantee, a share transfer, a board resolution signed by directors in several countries. A qualified electronic signature has the equivalent legal effect of a handwritten signature (Article 25(2) of the eIDAS Regulation) and rests on a certificate issued to an identified person.

The third case is an instruction that moves money or changes who may act for the client. An instruction of that kind is a target for impersonation. One that comes from a verified account is easier to rely on than one that comes from an email address.

The difference matters less in other settings. A firm that identifies its clients in person, and uses a portal only to pass routine documents back and forth, gains little from verifying them a second time. So does a firm that already runs a separate identity check and a separate qualified signing service, and is content to keep three records. For that firm the benefit is convenience and a single record. For the first three cases the benefit is evidence.

No. It can supply one part of it. Article 20(1) of the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation lists the measures an obliged entity must apply. Identifying the customer and verifying their identity is the first. The others include identifying beneficial owners, understanding the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship, checking for targeted financial sanctions, determining whether the customer is a politically exposed person, and conducting ongoing monitoring.

A verified identity answers the first point for a natural person. It says nothing about who owns a client company, where the money comes from or whether the engagement makes sense. Those are judgments for the firm.

Responsibility also stays with the firm. An obliged entity may outsource tasks to a service provider, and it remains fully liable for any act or omission connected to them (Article 18(2)). It must keep a record of the actions taken to comply, including the decisions and their justifications (Article 21(3)). It must be able to demonstrate to its supervisor at all times that the measures taken are appropriate to the risks (Article 20(4)).

A check made once also ages. Customer information has to be kept up to date. The period between updates may not exceed one year for higher-risk customers, or five years for all others (Article 26(2)). The regulation applies from 10 July 2027.

The limits are those of any client portal, plus three of its own.

Verification is a hurdle. The client needs an identity document that the method accepts, and usually a smartphone. Some clients will find the step intrusive for a simple exchange of documents, and some will not finish it. A firm needs a fallback for them, and the fallback then sits outside the single record.

The firm depends on one supplier for three things: the identity check, the documents and the signatures. That makes the contract and the way out more important than with a single-purpose tool. The supplier is normally a processor of the firm's client data, so the firm may use it only if it provides sufficient guarantees (Article 28(1) of the GDPR). Both must apply security appropriate to the risk (Article 32). Identity documents and biometric checks raise that risk. The firm should also confirm that verification evidence, documents and the activity record can all be exported.

The label proves nothing by itself. Two workspaces can both be called verified and differ widely in how they check identity. The individual claims can be tested. A claim to qualified signatures can be checked against the EU Trusted List, which names every qualified trust service provider and its services. A claim about the identity method can be checked by asking which standard it was assessed against, and by whom.

The limits of any portal remain. A downloaded file leaves the workspace. Notices still travel by email. The record covers only what happens inside.